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USE OF THE DOCTRINE OF UNFAIR COMPETITION TO
SUPPLEMENT COPYRIGHT IN THE PROTECTION
OF LITERARY AND MUSICAL PROPERTY
By PAUL OBERST*
Of all the property rights which the law secures to man,
one of the most peculiarly entitled to protection in a highly
civilized society is a right to the products of one's mental effort.
This is especialy true of what is denominated literary prop-
erty,' a classification which has grown to include books, musical
compositions, plays, pictures, operas, art works, radio scripts,
and the like.
By the common law of England, it has been said, the
author of any book or literary composition had the sole right of
first printing and publishing the work for sale, and might bring
an action against any person who printed, published and sold
it without his consent.2 The law did not take this right away
upon his publishing the book or literary composition, the author
and his assigns having the sole right of printing and publish-
ing it in perpetuity.3 So uncertain and ill-defined was this
common law copyright, however, that in 1709 the first copyright
Act was passed by Parliament.4 It provided that upon com-
pliance with certain requirements, an author should be entitled
to the sole right to print his book for a period of 14 years, with
a right to renew for a similar term if he was living at the
expiration of the first term. Upon construction of this act it
* A. B., Evansville College, LL. B., University of Kentucky,
Graduate Fellow, University of Michigan Law School, 1939-40,
Research Assistant in Administrative Law, University of Michigan
Law School, 1940-41.
lCopinger, Law of Copyright (7th ed. 1936), 3. Quoted by
Meekins, D. J. in Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338, 9 (1939); "Noth-
ing can with greater propriety be called a man's property than the
fruit of his brains." The property in any article or substance accru-
ing to him by reason of his own mechanical labor is never denied
him; the labor of his mind is no less arduous and consequently no less
worthy of the protection of the law. And see Wheaton v. Peters,
33 U. S. 591, 656 (1894): "The argument that a literary man is as
much entitled to the product of his labor as any other member of
society cannot be controverted."
'Donaldsons v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (1774).
'Ibid.
'Stats. at Large, 8 Anne, Chap. 19 (1709).
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was determined that an author's common law copy-right re-
mained until publication, 5 but that after publication his claim
for protection had to be based on his statutory right, if any, his
common law right being merged into the statutory right upon
publication.0 Parliament went still further in the Copyright
Act of 1911,7 and by statute abolished all copyright except that
under provisions of the act.8
The United States Constitution provides that "The Con-
gress shall have power . . . to promote the progress of science
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries.' ' Pursuant thereto, Congress passed the first
Copyright Act in 1790. In construing this act, the Supreme
Court followed Donaldsons v. Beckett' o in holding that any
common law copyright that had existed after publication was
swallowed up by the statutory provisions." The court went so
far as to suggest that the English common law copyright before
publication was not in force in the United States, it being "not
suited to our conditions", but a common law copyright to un-
published work is now clearly established in the United States
'Donaldsons v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (1774).
"Prior to the Copyright Act of 1911, a common law copyright in
unpublished works was admitted." Copinger, op. cit, supra note
1,4.
Donaldsons v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (1774).
Stats. at Large, 142 Geo. 5, c. 46 (1911).
'The Act of 1911 provides: Part III, sec. 31, "No person shall be
entitled to copyright, or similar right, in any literary, musical or artis-
tic work, whether published or unpublished, otherwise than under
and in accordance with the provisions of this act, or of any other
statutory enactment for the time being in force, but nothing in this
section shall be construed as abrogating any right or jurisdiction to
restrain a breach of trust or confidence."
'Cons. Art. 1, sec. 8.
" 4 Burr. 2408 (1774).
"Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U. S. 591 (1834); Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Walker, 210 U. S. 356, 362 (1898); Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper,
215 U. S. 182, 188 (1909); O'Neill v. General Film Co., 171 N. Y. App.
Div. 854, 157 N. Y. Supp. 1028 (1916); "While the propriety of these
decisions has been the subject of a good deal of controversy among
legal writers, it seems now to be considered the settled law of this
country and England that the right of an author to a monopoly of his
publications is measured and determined by the copyright act-in
other words, that while a right did exist by common law, it has been
superseded by statute." Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U. S. 82, 85 (1898).
See also Ladas, The International Protection of Literary and Artistic
Property (1938) 686.
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by decision, 12 and is specifically recognized under the present
Copyright Act.13
An author or composer, therefore, has the right of first
publication by common law, and the right to a monopoly in
publishing copies for a definite period by statute. He may
enforce these rights by suits for injunction, 14 damages,15 an
accounting,' 6 or statutory penalties,' 7 when another has un-
lawfully infringed the author's monopoly.
If this were the only protection afforded literary property,
however, the author or composer often would be without remedy.
The ingenuity of the literary pirate has devised many ways in
which literary property may be appropriated without copyright
infringement. One may publish and copyright a successful
book, only to discover that much of the profit is being diverted
by the book of another which is similar in title, subject-matter
or appearance. Or one may create literary property, such as
a newspaper article, which is not susceptible of copyright, and
lience cannot be protected under the Copyright Act.
It has been said that the "author or owner of a book or
play, by publishing it, which is a condition precedent to obtain-
ing a copyright, waives and abandons his common law rights
therein, and must thenceforth depend upon the statutory rights
conferred by the acts of Congress.' I s This is not literally true,
however. Supplementing the Copyright Law in the protection
of literary property, we find the common law doctrine of unfair
competition. It is proposed to consider herein some of the situa-
I" Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N. Y. 532 (1872); Jenkins v. News Syndi-
cate, 128 N. Y. Misc. 284, 219 N. Y. Supp. 196 (1926); Goldmark v.
Kreling, 35 Fed. 661 (1888).
1 Sec. 2 of the Act provides that "nothing in this act shall be
construed to annul or limit the right of the author or proprietor of
an unpublished work, at common law or equity, to prevent the copy-
ing, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent
and to obtain damages therefore."
"U. S. C. A. Title 17, sec. 25a, 36. "In cases of infringement of
copyright, an injunction has always been recognized as a proper
remedy, because of the inadequacy of the legal remedy." Pierpont v.
Fowle, 19 Fed. Cases 652 (1846).
' U. S. C. A. Title 17, sec. 25b, and footnotes 175-182, pp. 131-137.
"The right to an accounting of profits is incident to the right to
an injunction in copyright cases. McCaleb v. Fox Film Corp.
(C. C. A. 1924) 299 Fed. 48.
,U. S. C. A. Title 17, sec. 25b, and footnotes 101-107, pp. 110-112.
"O'Neill v. General Film Co., 171 N. Y. App. Div. 854, 157 N. Y. S.
1028 (1916).
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tions in which the law of unfair competition has been utilized to
protect literary property, copyrighted or uncopyrighted.
The law of unfair competition had its origin in the demand
for the protection of merchant's trademarks. At first the
gravamen of the action was the damage done to a merchant's
reputation by the passing off of inferior goods under his trade-
mark.1 9 As the concept developed, no damage to the merchant's
reputation had to be proved and emphasis was placed upon the
dishonesty of taking, by unfair means of any sort, the business
and good will built up by a merchant. 20 The basis of the action,
however, continued to be the passing off of one's goods as those
of another, unfairly and fraudulently, and the action is re-
ferred to in England today as "passing off."'2 1
In recent years the law of unfair competition seems to be
expanding greatly in America and some cases seem to hold that
any wrongful misappropriation of the labors of another is
unfair competition, even though no element of deceit or of
passing off is present.22 One writer has named the doctrine
the "free ride" doctrine-equity will not allow one to take a
"free ride" at his competitor's expense. 23 It is proposed to
examine the law of unfair competition as it has been applied
to the protection of literary property: first, in "passing off"
cases; and second, in "free ride" cases.
TITLES
The commonest type of passing off in the literary field is
the use of the same or a similar title for a different work. The
titles to books and plays generally cannot be copyrighted be-
cause they are not original literary compositions. 24 It would
"' Blofeld v. Payne, 4 B. & Ad. 410, 110 Eng. Rep. 509 (1833).
"Weever v. Brayton, 152 Mass. 101, 25 N. E. 46 (1890).
"Haines, Efforts to Define Unfair Competition (1919) 29 Yale
S. J. 1.
I International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215
(1918); Fonotipia, Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 Fed. 951 (1909); Waring v.
WDAS, 327 Pa. 423, 194 AUt. 631 (1937).
'Note (1933) 46 Harv. L. R. 1171.
Osgood v. Allen, 18 Fed. Cases No. 10603 (1872); Harper v.
Ranous, 67 Fed. 904 (1895); Corbett v. Purdy, 80 Fed. 901 (1897);
Underhill v. Schenk, 187 N. Y. Supp. 589 (1921). See Dicks v. Gates,
18 Chan. Div. 76 (1881), where the court said that it was "conceiv-
able" that there might be a copyright of a title, but only if it were
extremely long and elaborate. And see Ladas, The International
Protection of Literary and Artistic Property (1938) 736.
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be difficult on the one hand to create a wholly original title, and
on the other hand it is doubtful whether sufficient labor of com-
position is involved to justify the portection of a title as a
literary work,2 5 even if it were wholly original. As far as the
law of copyright is involved, an author who had written and
copyrighted a book or play could not prevent another author
from publishing or producing a similar, though different, work
with the same title as that of the first author's. 26 By the law
of unfair competition, however, this would be wrongful pass-
ing off, if it was an attempt to appropriate to one's own benefit
a title that had become connected in the minds of the public
with the work of the first author,2 7 and could therefore be
restrained. 28
One who publishes an uncopyrighted work is likewise en-
titled to protect himself against the appropriation of his efforts
by one who publishes a different work under the same title.29
Before he can claim protection on the grounds of unfair com-
petition the publisher must show that his title has acquired
"secondary meaning", that is, that it is associated in the minds
SCopinger, op. cit. supra note 1; Glaser v. St. Elmo, 175 Fed.
276 (1909); Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Majectic Pictures Corp.
70 Fed. (2d) 300 (1934).
" "I think that the authorities, particularly the American cases,
preponderate that the copyright of a book does not prevent other
persons from taking the same title for another book even in the case
of an entirely unexpired copyright." Glaser v. St. Elmo Co., 175
Fed. 276, 278 (1909).
"'. . the plaintiff succeeds as soon as he shows an audience
educated to understand that the title means his play." Judge
Learned Hand in International Film Service, Inc. v. Associated Pro-
ducers, Inc. v. Associated Producers, Inc., 273 Fed. 585 (1921).
'Paramore v. Mack Sennett, 9 Fed. (2d.) 66 (1925) (Plaintiff
had written and copyrighted "The Ballad of Yukon Jake" and pre-
pared a scenario "Yukon Jake, the Killer" on the same plot. Held,
the author was entitled to an injunction, an accounting and damages
against defendant who had produced an entirely different story under
the title "Yuk~on Jake"); Warner Bros. Pictures v. Majestic Pictures.
70 Fed. (2d.) 310 (1934) (Plaintiff owner of motion picture rights of
play "Gold Diggers" had produced 'The Gold Diggers of Broadway"
and "The Gold Diggers of 1933." Held, entitled to an injunction
against defendant's production of the "Gold Diggers of Paris".)
Collier v. Jones, 120 N. Y. Supp. 991 (1910). (The publishers
of ' The Harvard Classics" or "Dr. Elliott's Five-Foot Shelf of the
World's Best Books."); Hopkins Amusement Co. v. Frohman, 202 Ill.
541, 67 N. E. 391 (1903). (Play "Sherlock Holmes, Detective"
enjoined by Producers of "Sherlock Holmes" on the ground of public
deception.) See also, Social Register Ass'n v. Howard, 60 Fed. 270(1894) ("Social Register" is infringed by "Howard's Social Register").
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of the public with his particular work.80 The titles must be suf-
ficiently alike so as to deceive the public, a principle which
naturally gives the court some discretion in determining what
constitutes infringement.31
Where the copyright on a book has expired, or if it never
was copyrighted, ordinarily there is nothing to prevent another
from publishing that work under its proper title.3 2 But if,
during the period of copyright, a title becomes associated in
the minds of the public with a particular person, even on
expiration of the copyright another cannot publish the work
without indicating its origin.33
The nature of the work sought to be protected has a direct
bearing in the determination of whether or not, as a matter of
fact, the similarity of titles will cause confusion in the minds of
the public, and consequently, unfair competition with the work
of the plaintiff. Titles of plays and moving-pictures are more
readily protected than titles of books. 34
' Manners v. Triangle Film Corp., 247 Fed. 301 (1913) (Produc-
tion of play "Happiness" seven times did not entitle plaintiff to an
injunction against defendant's motion picture, based on different
story, under the title "Happiness".); Bowers v. Krugel, 8 T. M. Rep.
400 (1918) (Play "The Unborn" was presented nine times and pub-
lished in a magazine. Held; Owner not entitled to injunction against
production of a different motion picture under the same title. Law of
unfair competition applicable, but title had not acquired secondary
meaning.)
Thus it was held that the play "Charley's Aunt" was not in-
fringed by the title "Charley's Uncle", the court saying that "it can-
not seriously be contended that by adopting the title "Charley's Aunt"
for his play, the author monopolized the right to all the other rela-
tives." Frohman v. Miller, 29 N. Y. Supp. 1109 (1894). On the
other hand the producers of the photoplay "Blind Youth" could enjoin
the production of a different motion picture under the title "The
Blindness of Youth". National Pictures Theatres v. Foundation Film
Corp., 266 Fed. 208 (1928). And "The House of a Thousand Candies"
is not infringed by "The House of a Thousand Scandals". Selig
Polyscope Co. v. Mutual Film Corp., 169 N. Y. Supp. 369 (1918).
'2Merriam v. Ogilvie, 159 Fed. 638 (1908); Glaser v. St. Elmo Co.,
175 Fed. 276 (1909); Nims, Unfair Competition (3rd. ed. 1929) 746.
Ogilive v. Merriam, 149 Fed. 858 (1907). When the copyright
of Webster's Dictionary expired any person had the right to publish
the book and call it by its generic name. But the name had also
acquired a secondary meaning, and had come to indicate to the
public a book published and sold by the publisher who took out the
copyright. Hence, while no restrictions could be imposed on use of
the name "Webster's", it should not be used to make the public think
they are buying a book published by the person who produced the
copyright book. See also, Atlas Mfg. Co. v. Street and Smith, 204
Fed. 398 (1913).
1 "The cases decided in the U. S. indicate that the courts are more
ready to protect titles of plays and motion pictures under the law of
UNFAIR COMPETITION
TiE PHYSiCAL APPEARANCE OF BOOKS
Another ingenious way in which literary pirates might
infringe upon literary property without violating the copy-
right laws is by imitation of the physical appearance of a copy-
righted book, with or without imitation of the title. Copyright
is concerned with the order of words, and not at all with the
physical appearance of the book in which they are published.35
Unfair competition would result, however, if one put out a book
so similar in physical appearance to the book of another that it
might be passed off as the latter's, and hence this practice can
be enjoined under the common law.36 It is not necessary that
the infringing work be exactly, or even approximately like that
of the complainant's, but "in order to render it necessary that
a publication or imitation of this nature should be restrained, it
is sufficient that persons who may desire to purchase the plain-
tiff's publication, might very well accept that of the defendant,
supposing and believing it be the same". 37 That the difference
might be readily be detected by comparison of one book with the
other is no defense,38 but it is not sufficient that a purchaser
inattentively might accept the defendant's publication place of
the plaintiff's. 39
Resemblance in mere form or size is not unfair competition,
unfair competition than titles of books and other publications with
the exception of periodicals, dictionaries, and the like. The reason
for this is that deception is easier in these cases, whereas in the case
of books, stories, etc., the public gives greater attention to the name
of the author than to the title of the work," Ladas, op. cit. supra note
24, at p. 738.
Copinger, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 2.
' Thus the publishers of a series of detective stories entitled "Old
Sleuth's Own" were entitled to enjoin the owners of the copyright to
other stories written by "Old Sleuth" from imitating the distinctive
make-up of the former-yellow cover with black and red printed
titles and illustrations (see the reproduction in the report). J. S.
Ogilvie Pub. Co. v. Royal Publ. Co., 241 Pa. 5, 88 Atl. 316 (1913).
Similarly where plaintiff published a series of books containing
uncopyrighted hymns, illustrated with illuminated capitals and type
adapted from ancient missals, an injunction would lie to restraindefendant from selling a series identical save in artistic merit. Dutton
v. Cupples, 117 N. Y. App. Div. 172, 102 N. Y. Supp. 309 (1907). This
last case is interesting because it illustrates the wrong that the law
of unfair competition was first designed to protect-loss of reputation
by production of inferior copies by a competitor. See note 19, supra.
' Potter v. McPherson, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. N. Y. (21 Hun) 559, at
566 (1880).
* Id.
'Stokes v. Allen, 56 Hun 526, 9 N. Y. Supp. 846 (1896).
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however, since that alone is not enough to connect a volume in
the mind of the public with the original publisher. 40  Where
there is a resemblance sufficient to constitute infringement it is
not necessary to prove that the similarity was intentional, since
the law presumes that the similarity was intentional and
fraudulent with a view of appropriation of the trade and good
will of another.4 1
NEws
Newspapers are specifically named by the United States
Copyright Act as one of the classifications for registration, 42
and a contribution to a newspaper, as a literary product, is the
subject of copyright, though it may also convey news.43 News
as such, however, is not the subject of copyright.4 4 There are
two reasons for this. First, a news item is not an original
literary creation, but a mere report of happenings; second, it
was not the intention of Congress to give the one who first
reported an historic event the exclusive right for any period
to spread knowledge of it.4 5 Nor is news capable of being
protected under principles of common law copyright, or right
of first publication, since the very value of news lies in publica-
tion, which is a dedication to the public.40
No relief under the copyright laws was available, therefore,
when International News Service, a news-gathering agency,
began to copy news items from the bulletin boards and columns
of newspapers served by the Associated Press, a rival news
agency, and to distribute the pirated news items to its member
papers. On the very face of it, such conduct would seem unjust,
and a wrongful taking of what seems to be another's property.
Relief was afforded in the landmark case of International News
Service v. Associated Press47 by application of common law
principles of unfair competition.
' Merriam v. Texas Siftings Pub. Co., 49 Fed. 944 (1892) (a Web-
ster's dictionary case).
"Potter v. McPherson, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. (N. Y.) (21 Hun) 559, at
567 (1880); Day v. Webster, 23 App. Div. 601, 49 N. Y. Supp., 314(1897).
1U. S. C. A. Title 17, sec. 5(b).
International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215
(1918).
" Id.
45Id.
"See notes 6 and 11, supra.
International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215(1918).
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The unfair competition of the International News Service
v. Associated Press is a new kind of unfair competition, however.
There is no possibility of damaging reputation by inferior
goods48 ; there is not even the element of passing off one's goods
as those of another.4 9 The charge is rather that the defendant
is passing off the goods of another as his own. Nevertheless,
even if the news items pirated by International News Service
had been published in the member papers under the Associated
Press name, justice still would not be satisfied.50 The case is
not put on the basis of "passing off" at all, but on the basis of
"misappropriation". "We need not affirm any general and
absolute property in the news as such," the court said. "It has
all the attributes of property necessary for determining that a
misappropriation of it by a competitor is unfair competition
because contrary to good conscience. ' 'S
Thus we have a new and broader interpretation of the law
of unfair competition-one cannot appropriate to his own use
the results of the effort and work of another in a manner that is
unfair and contrary to good conscience. It is a principle which,
if applied liberally, has great possibilities in the protection of
literary, dramatic and musical property. The "free ride"
doctrine has since been applied several times in cases involving
radio broadcasting of items culled from newspapers, and an
injunction granted against the radio broadcasts as unfair
competition with the newspaper.52
PERFOR mEE'S STYLES AND THE "FREE RIDE"
While the "free ride" doctrine of unfair competition has
not been widely adopted, it has been applied in several interest-
a Cf. notes 19 and 26, supra.
"Cf. note 20, supra.
'"Besides the misappropriation, there are elements of imitation,
of false pretenses, in defendant's practices. . . But these ele-
ments, although accentuating the wrong, are not the essence of it.
It is something more than the advantage of celebrity of which the
complainant is being deprived." International News Service v.
Associated Pross, 248 U. S. 215, 242 (1918).
" Id. at pages 236, 240.
" Associated Press v. Sioux Falls Broadcast Assn. (Dis. Ct. S.
Dak.-unreported 1933); and Note (1934) 46 Harv. L. R. 1171, 1175,
where it is suggested that although there was benefit to the defendant,
it is doubtful that the broadcasts were detrimental to the business of
the Associated Press; Associated Press v. K. V. 0. S. 80 Fed. (2d.)
575 (1935), reversed on jurisdictional grounds 299 U. S. 269 (1936).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
ing cases to the protection of musical and dramatic property, in
addition to the newspaper cases referred to above. In Charlic
Chaplin v. Amador53 , Charlie Chaplin was given an injunction
against one Amador, who, under the name of "Charlie Aplin"
produced a series of comedies in which he closely imitated the
costume, mannerisms, and method of performance of Chaplin.
It is clear that an actor can have no copyright in his methods of
playing under the present Copyright Act,54 and it has been
decided that there is no common law copyright in performances
of dancers and singers. 55 Under the principles of unfair
competition, however, Amador was enjoined "from imitating the
role which the plaintiff originated, and thereby injuring plaintiff
and deceiving the public . . ." While there is some discussion
of fraud on the public, the court seemed to recognize clearly
that the imitation of the role created by Chaplin was a real
wrong to the plaintiff, and declared that even if Amador
dropped the name "Charlie Aplin" the injunction would still
stand.
A more recent application of the "free ride" doctrine of
unfair competition is the case of Waring v. W.D.A.S.5 6
Waring, who had perfected a unique style of playing popular
music, had made recordings which were labeled "not licensed
for radio broadcasting". Defendant radio station, which broad-
cast some of these records, was enjoined from doing so in a
decision based partly on the grounds of unfair competition.
Quoting the broad language of the Associated Press case, the
court recognized a right of property in musical style in the
creator and a right to be protected against any unfair appro-
priation "for its own profit of the musical genius and artistry of
the plaintiff's orchestra in commercial competition with the
orchestra itself.57 There was clearly no attempt to defraud the
public in any way nor was there any element of surreptitious
conduct. The grievance was that a band which could secure
$12,500 for an hour's broadcast should have to compete with a
93 Cal. 358, 269 Pac. 544 (1928).
Ladas, op. cit. supra note 24. Ladas expresses a doubt as to
whether the Act could be amended to include methods of playing,
since the Constitution gives Congress power to legislate in connection
with "writings" only.
"Savage v. Hoffman, 159 Fed. 584 (1908).
327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937).
"Id. at 640.
UNFAIR COMPETITION
recorded program of its own music purchased by the defendant
at seventy-five cents per record and broadcast without the
plaintiff's consent.
In the case of Waring v. Dunlea,58 Waring again secured
an injunction under somewhat similar circumstances. Waring
had made certain recordings for the Ford Motor Company
programs, and had distributed the recordings with a notice that
their use was limited to those programs only. The defendant,
who was not a licensee, broadcast one of the records without the
plaintiff's consent. The court recognized a right of imposing
equitable restrictions on chattels, but also put its decision on the
ground of unfair competition: "To allow respondent to benefit
financially by complainants work and skill would be an unfair
trade practice and equity will enjoin such effort on the part of
the respondent.' '59
In R.C.A. Mfg. Jo. v. WhitemanO0 the court recognized "a
common law property right in and to his unique interpretation
of musical selections"61 in favor of Mir. Paul Whiteman, another
prominent dance band leader. In a suit to enjoin the playing
of Whiteman recordings by station WNEW, the defendant
station pointed out that some of the earlier recordings did not
bear the notice found on recordings made subsequent to
November, 1932: "Not Licensed for Radio Brodeast". The
court held, however, that the sale of a Whiteman record, with-
out any restrictive notice, gave the purchaser no right to broad-
cast its contents over the radio, without special permission,
because to do so would be unfair competition. The decision is
based squarely on the International News Service case, and the
"principles on unfair competition, so convincingly expressed by
Mr. Justice Pitney."' 62
Further decisions along this line could go far to secure to
authors and composers the "fruit of their brains." Neverthe-
less, the "free ride" doctrine has by no means met with uni-
versal approval and application in the courts, and failure to
point out contrary decisions might leave a very erroneous
impression.
'26 F. Supp. 338 (1939).
Id. at 340.N28 F. Supp. 787 (1939).
CId. at 790.
Id. at 794.
K. L. J.-3
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In Crumit v. Marcus Loew Booking Agency, 3 a preliminary
injunction to restrain defendants from broadcasting a phono-
graph record, made by the plaintiff and bearing the customary
notice "Not to be used for Radio Broadcasting", was denied on
the grounds that there was not sufficient proof of a licensing
agreement or that the defendant knew of the terms of such
agreement, if it existed.64 And the New York court again
denied an injunction to a publisher who had popularized at
great expense an old song, "Gambler's Blues", under a new
title, "St. James Infirmary Blues", and who was seeking to
restrain defendant from publishing the song under the new
title.65
We may conclude, however, that the courts, on the whole,
have been quite generous in protecting original literary,
musical, and artistic creations, in recognizing a property right
in them, and in protecting this right on liberal principles of un-
fair competition. Sports promoters have been similarly protected
from competition at the hands of persons who seek to capitalize
unfairly on their efforts. Injunctions have been granted against
persons who sought to erect stands overlooking the promoters'
grounds, 66 and against persons who sought to broadcast an
account of the play as it occurred 67 or to photograph it.68
162 Misc. 225, 293 N. Y. Supp. 63 (1936).
Cf. with the Whiteman case, where the court held that a radio
broadcast of a Whiteman record without permission was unfair com-
petition, even though the record did not bear a restrictive notice.
Air. Whiteman's suit, unfortunately for him, was complicated by
the fact that he had conveyed "all rights" to the records made prior
to 1934 to RCA Victor. Mr. Whiteman began the suit against the
owner of station WNGW and the sponsor of the offending program,
and, after intervention of RCA Victor, and withdrawal of the original
suit, ended up on the wrong end of the injunction along with the two
original defendants. The court after recognizing his right, also
recognized his power to bargain it away, and that the broadcasting
rights had passed under the terms of earlier contracts. In the con-
tract of Sept. 5, 1934, Whiteman included a provision that the RCA
Victor did not acquire a right to sell records for radio broadcasting.
Even this did not give him, acting alone, the right to license a broad-
casting station to play over the radio a phonograph record manufac-
tured by RCA Victor, without the Corporation's consent.
IGotham Music Service v. Denton and Haskins Music Pub. Co.,
259 N. Y. 86, 181 N. E. 57 (1932).
"Detroit Baseball Club v. Deppert, 61 Mich. 63, 27 N. W. 856
(1886).
' Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Trans-Radio Press
Service, Inc. 165 Misc. 71, 300 N. Y. Supp. 159 (1937); Pittsburgh
Athletic Club v. KQV Broadcasting Co. 24 F. Supp. 490 1938).
Contra, National Exhibition Co. v. Teleflash, Inc. 24 F. Supp. 488
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On the other hand, injunctions have been denied in cases
which, on logical grounds, seem equally appropriate for applica-
tion of the "free ride" theory. The courts have refused to
protect the originator of an advertising scheme,69 or to prevent
one manufacturer from pirating the fabric designs of another.70
The prospect of a liberal application of the "free ride"
doctrine of unfair competition has met with mixed receiption in
the legal periodicals. 71 Following the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Brandeis72 in the International News Service case,
there has been some tendency to view the development of the
doctrine as an inadvisable excursion of the courts into fields
where legislative action would be more desirable.73
Mlr. Chafee, in an entertaining article,74 has pictured the
International News Service ease as presenting a "far-flung
proclamation of Conquest"--an extension of unfair competition
"over all it popularly means, namely, every unfairness by a
competitor", and citing four contrary decisions,75 concludes that
(1936); Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co., Ltd. v.
Taylor, 43 Argus L. R. 597 (1937).
"Rudolph Mayer Pictures, Inc. v. Pathe News, Inc., 235 App.
Div. 774 (N. Y. 1932).
' Benj. T. Crump Co. v. Lindsay, Inc., 130 Va. 144, 107 S. E. 679
(1921) (motor parts catalog); Affiliated Enterprises v. Gruber, 86
F. 2d 958 (1936) (bank night); Westminster Laundry Co. v. Hesse
Envelope Co., 174 Mo. App. 238, 156 S. W. 767 (1913).
" Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp. 35 F. (2d) 279 (1929).
' Pro, Rogers, Unfair Competition (1919) 17 Mich. L. R. 490;
Grismore, Are Unfair Methods of Competition Actionable at the Suit
of a Competitor? (1935) 33 Mich. L. R. 321; Note (1933) 46 Harv.
L. R. 1171; Note (1939) 37 Mich. L. R. 968; Note (1938) 48 Yale L. J.
288; Contra Note (1934) 47 Harv. L. R. 1419; Chafee, Unfair Com-
petition (1940) 53 Harv. L. R. 1289.
" In pointing out the advisibility of leaving the question of
regulating new agencies to Congress, Mr. Justice Brandeis said,
the creation or recognition by courts of a new private right
may work serious injury to the general public unless the boundaries
of the right are definitely established and wisely guarded. In order
to reconcile the new private right with the public interest, it may
be necessary to prescribe limitations and rules for its enjoyment;
and also to provide administrative machinery for enforcing the rules."
International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 263
(1918).
' Note (1934) 47 Harv. L. R. 1419, 1427. "The diverse considera-
tions of policy and practice thus involved present a question which
might better be met by legislation than by the process of judicial
trial and error."
,Chafee, Unfair Competition (1940) 53 Harv. L. R. 1289.
SUpjohn v. Merrill, 261 Fed. 209 (1920); Crump Co., Inc. v.
Lindsay, Inc., 130 Va. 144, 107 S. E. 679 (1921); Mosler Safe Co. v.
Ely-Norris Safe Co., 273 U. S. 132 (1927); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk
Corp., 35 F. (2d) 279 (1929).
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the policy of Conquest has been rejected. Four reasons of social
policy render judges cautious, in varying degrees according to
the nature of the particular trade practice, Mr. Chafee
observes.78 First, the scope of protection should be capable of
reasonably accurate definition. Second, there is a policy against
monopolies-and when statutory monopolies are set up, it is
clear who has the right and who can grant the licenses. Third,
there is a policy of centralizing the protection of morality in
the government, rather than at the suit of the individual.
Fourth, some trade practices are better handled by administra-
tive agencies, such as the F.T.C., than by the courts.
Mr. Grismore, in his article Are Unfair Methods of
Competition Actionable at the Suit of a Competitor?7 7 doubts
whether the courts are less able to deal with unfair competition
in the broader sense than the legislature. Since Congress has
failed to define unfair competition, and has delegated the duty
of defining it to the Federal Trade Commission, he concludes
that the courts will be faced with the ultimate solution of the
problem.73
SUMMARY
In the protection of literary and artistic property, the
statutory right of copyright and the common law right of first
publication are supplemented by the common law principles of
unfair competition. 79 The "passing off" doctrine of unfair
competition is utilized to protect titles of books, plays, etc. and
the physical make-up of books. The "free ride" doctrine is
used to protect news from pirating, methods of performance of
an actor, and broadcasting rights of musicians who have per-
fected a unique style. In its broadest scope the doctrine of un-
fair competition not only prevents the passing off of the
defendant's goods as those of the plaintiff, but in some cases
extends to mere inequitable appropriation of the fruits of
another's labor to his detriment by a competitor.
It is submitted that however valid be the objections to a
general extension of the "free ride" doctrine in other fields, they
largely fail when applied to literary property. By its very
nature it is incapable of well-defined, comprehensive statutory
"53 Harv. L. R. 1289, 1317-1321 (1940).
'33 Mich. L. R. 321 (1935).
Id., at 333.
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treatment, and the judicial monopoly afforded can to no con-
siderable degree endanger the public good. One who
objects to this extension of common law principles into
a statutory field might well be answered in the words
of Chatfield, J., in Fonotipia, Ltd. v. Bradley: "... It would
seem that the appropriation of what has come to be recognized
as property rights or incorporeal interests in material objects,
out of which pecuniary profits can fairly be secured, may
properly, in certain kinds of cases, be protected by legislation;
but such intangible or abstract property rights would seem to
have claims upon the protection of equity, where the ground
for legislation is uncertain or difficult of determination, and
where the principles of equity plainly apply."8 0
" The law of unfair competition is not the only protection avail-
able. Equitable servitudes on chattels has been mentioned. There
is also the right of privacy, another developing doctrine. See also,
Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists,
Authors, and Creators (1940) 53 Harv. L. R. 554 for another sug-
gestion.
"Fonotipia, Ltd. v. Bradley, 121 Fed. 951, 962 (1909).
